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Overview	  
•  Anonymiza&on	  and	  data	  quality	  are	  in&mately	  
linked	  
•  Although	  this	  link	  has	  been	  properly	  
acknowledged	  in	  the	  CS	  and	  SDL	  literatures,	  
economics	  oﬀers	  a	  framework	  for	  formalizing	  
the	  linkage	  and	  analyzing	  op&mal	  decisions	  
and	  equilibrium	  outcomes	  
Technology	  
f I,φ;b( ) = 0 from I,φ( ) maxφ≤φ I φ( )  s.t. I 0( ) ≤ b{ }
where
I  is a measure of the information in a data publication
φ  is a measure of the privacy/confidentiality protection
b is the total resource limit
Technology	  of	  Anonymiza&on	  
•  Privacy	  (CS)/conﬁden&ality	  (SDL)	  controls	  on	  
data	  publica&on	  can	  be	  described	  formally	  as	  
a	  produc&on	  possibility	  fron&er	  
•  A	  PPF	  measures	  the	  maximum	  a_ainable	  data	  
quality	  when	  the	  privacy	  controls	  are	  
parameterized	  as	  φ,	  (-­‐ε	  from	  the	  diﬀeren&al	  
privacy	  viewpoint)	  
•  This	  is	  related	  to	  risk-­‐u&lity	  curves	  in	  sta&s&cs	  
but	  the	  formaliza&on	  is	  more	  demanding	  
Preferences	  
vi yi; I,φ, p( ) =maxx ui x, I,φ( )  s.t. x
T p ≤ yi
i =1,...,N
where
ui  is consumer i's direct utility function
vi  is consumer i's indirect utility function
yi  is consumer i's income
I,φ  are the public goods (data information and privacy)
xi  is the chosen private good bundle
p is the vector of private good prices
Public	  Goods	  and	  Private	  Goods	  
•  My	  formula&on	  of	  the	  problem	  makes	  both	  
the	  data	  publica&on	  (I)	  and	  the	  privacy	  
associated	  with	  the	  publica&on	  (φ)	  public	  
goods.	  
•  No	  privileged	  access	  to	  the	  data	  (think:	  public-­‐
use	  tables	  or	  series)	  
•  Equal	  protec&on	  of	  all	  consumer/ci&zens	  
Samuelson	  (1954)	  Equilibrium	  




PPF :  f I,φ,b( ) = 0
Optimal production of the public goods I 0,φ 0( )  
maximize SWF  subject to PPF.
∂f I 0,φ 0,b( )
∂φ










∂I vi yi, I





Implica&ons	  of	  Public	  Good	  Model	  
•  With	  zero	  collec&on	  costs	  (PPF	  depends	  only	  on	  the	  
privacy	  technology),	  always	  conduct	  a	  census	  (or,	  use	  
all	  the	  administra&ve	  records)	  
•  Straighkorward	  to	  relax	  this,	  but	  not	  helpful	  
•  Set	  the	  marginal	  rate	  of	  transforma&on	  (slope	  of	  the	  
PPF)	  equal	  to	  the	  ra&o	  of	  the	  sums	  of	  the	  marginal	  
u&li&es	  of	  the	  consumers	  (not	  the	  marginal	  rate	  of	  
subs&tu&on	  as	  with	  a	  private	  good)	  
•  Private	  provision	  of	  I	  fails;	  it	  is	  undersupplied,	  privacy	  
is	  oversupplied	  
Special	  Case:	  Separable	  U&lity	  
∂f I 0,φ 0,b( )
∂φ










∂I vi yi, I






















•  The	  op&mal	  choice	  of	  data	  informa&on	  and	  privacy	  
depends	  upon	  the	  ra&o	  of	  average	  marginal	  u&li&es.	  
•  Op&mal	  choice	  caters	  to	  the	  average	  consumer	  (not	  
an	  extreme	  consumer)	  
Special	  Case:	  Separable,	  Iden&cal	  
U&lity	  
•  The	  op&mal	  choice	  can	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  
representa&ve	  consumer	  even	  though	  all	  consumers	  
are	  not	  iden&cal,	  so	  there	  is	  s&ll	  demand	  for	  the	  
informa&on	  
∂f I 0,φ 0,b( )
∂φ










∂I vi yi, I




















I 0,φ 0, p( )
∂v
∂I I
0,φ 0, p( )
Special	  Case:	  Non-­‐separable	  
Quadra&c	  U&lity	  I	  
•  The	  op&mal	  choice	  depends	  on	  the	  ra&o	  of	  weighted	  
means	  of	  income,	  weighted	  by	  privacy	  preferences	  in	  
the	  numerator	  and	  by	  informa&on	  preferences	  in	  the	  
denominator	  
∂f I 0,φ 0,b( )
∂φ
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Special	  Case:	  Non-­‐separable	  
Quadra&c	  U&lity	  II	  
•  The	  op&mal	  choice	  depends	  on	  the	  ra&o	  of	  
covariances	  of	  preferences	  towards	  privacy	  
(numerator)	  and	  informa&on	  (denominator)	  with	  
income	  
∂f I 0,φ 0,b( )
∂φ

























Cov δi, yi[ ]φ 0
Cov ηi, yi[ ] I 0
•  Based	  on	  the	  Jensen-­‐Shannon	  distance	  between	  the	  true	  
probabili&es	  over	  a	  grid	  k	  =	  1,	  …,	  K	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  and	  the	  probability	  
in	  each	  cell	  aoer	  protec&on	  	  
•  Note	  that	  the	  total	  informa&on	  from	  a	  census	  of	  N	  individuals	  
is	  normalized	  to	  1,	  this	  would	  change	  if	  the	  size	  of	  the	  
popula&on	  changes,	  general	  form	  is	  b(N)	  
Example	  1	  PPF	  
IJSD φ( ) =1− 0.5 π k log2
π k
0.5πˆ k φ( )+ 0.5π kk
∑ + 0.5 πˆ k φ( ) log2
πˆ k φ( )
0.5πˆ k φ( )+ 0.5π kk
∑
π k( )



















Expected	  Ajusted	  Epsilon	  





















Expected	  Adjusted	  Epsilon	  
PPF:	  LODES	  Quality	  Measured	  by	  Jensen-­‐Shannon	  Divergence	  (Zoomed)	  
Posterior-­‐Likelihood	  
Synthe&c-­‐Likelihood	  
•  Based	  on	  the	  root	  mean	  integrated	  squared	  error	  from	  the	  
same	  census	  of	  N	  individuals	  published	  with	  privacy	  φ	  	  
Example	  2	  PPF	  

















Expected	  Adjusted	  Epsilon	  
PPF:	  LODES	  Quality	  Root	  Mean	  Integrated	  Squared	  Error	  
Posterior-­‐Likelihood	  
Synthe&c-­‐Likelihood	  
Some	  Implica&ons	  for	  Op&mal	  
Data	  Publica&on/Privacy	  
•  The	  OnTheMap	  applica&on	  at	  the	  U.S.	  Census	  
Bureau	  published	  with	  φ	  =	  6.0	  a_aining	  data	  
quality	  of	  I	  =	  0.7	  
•  Using	  the	  separable	  quadra&c	  u&lity	  model	  
(speciﬁca&on	  II)	  above,	  this	  implies	  that	  the	  
Bureau	  considered	  the	  ra&o	  of	  preference	  
covariances	  to	  be	  0.002,	  which	  means	  that	  it	  
assumed	  preferences	  for	  informa&on	  were	  
much	  more	  correlated	  with	  income	  than	  were	  
preferences	  for	  privacy.	  
Alterna&ve	  Speciﬁca&on	  
•  Known	  as	  the	  Rawlsian	  social	  welfare	  func&on	  
•  Conjecture:	  diﬀeren&al	  privacy	  with	  ε	  =	  -­‐φ chosen	  
for	  the	  correct	  marginal	  individual	  (the	  one	  whose	  
u&lity	  is	  the	  minimum	  at	  the	  op&mum)	  is	  the	  global	  
op&mum	  privacy	

SWF :  min
i
vi yi, I,φ, p( )
PPF :  f I,φ,b( ) = 0
Wrapping	  Up	  
•  I	  have	  tried	  to	  pose	  an	  old	  problem	  (public	  
good	  provision)	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  might	  incite	  
mathema&cians	  to	  consider	  models	  of	  op&mal	  
data	  produc&on	  and	  protec&on	  
•  This	  work	  would	  build	  on	  the	  exis&ng	  CS	  and	  
SDL	  protec&on	  methods	  by	  explicitly	  
examining	  how	  the	  protec&on	  technology	  
interacts	  with	  the	  data	  quality	  measure	  (PPF),	  
and	  how	  preferences	  interact	  with	  the	  
publica&on	  choices	  (SWF)	  
